This is a continuation of the write up titled Wilāyat al-Faqīh: Exigency and Presuppositions written by Ayatollah Misbah Yazdei. In this part, we shall look at the presuppositions of the theory of Wilāyat al-Faqīh
The presuppositions of the theory of Wilāyat al-Faqīh
According to Islam, the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh is among the subjects of the philosophy of politics. Every theory has to be based on an array of prescribed principles and presumptions accepted by those who regard the theory as valid. A thorough examination of the principles that confirm the soundness of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and establish its superiority to other theories of the philosophy of politics naturally requires numerous discussions and voluminous books, which is not our concern as of the moment. Some of these discussions like those related to the exigency of government can be found in the book, Ḥuqūq wa Siyāsat dar Qur’ān [Law and Politics in the Qur’an]. Nevertheless, we will touch on whatever relevant to the issues treated in this volume.
1. The need for government
The first principle and presupposition of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, which is approved by most other political theories is the principle of the society’s need for government. It is opposed only by anarchism. Anarchists believe that people conduct themselves well by abiding by moral principles without the need for government, or they at least advocate the idea that the government should move in a direction leading to this end. That is, activities are carried out alongside the process of educating the people whereupon there is no need for government. The other philosophical schools, however, consider such proposition unrealistic. Also in practice, thousands of years of experience show that in all times there are individuals who are indifferent to moral laws and if there is no authority to control them, social life will end up in chaos and turmoil. In any case, the principle of the society’s need for government which is accepted by all schools of political philosophy, with the exception of anarchism, is affirmed by the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.
2. The legitimacy to govern is inherent in no individual or group
We can define ‘government’ in a simple way as “the apparatus which oversees the collective conduct of society and strives to direct it to a specific end.” Authority is either exercised through peaceful means or through the use of force. In other words, if some individuals refuse to follow the direction set by the government, they will be compelled to comply with the rules set by the government by force and the use of military and disciplinary organs. This definition along with its explanation applies to both legitimate and illegitimate governments. Therefore, we ought to know what the criterion or the condition of the legitimacy of a government is. Is legitimacy inherent in any individual or group? Or, is it inherent [dhātī] in anyone but something delegated by someone else? Some philosophers and schools of political philosophy hold that if someone has a superior and greater physical power, or is brighter and more intelligent than others, or racially superior to them, naturally such a person is good enough to be a ruler. Although these observations are attributed to some statesmen and political philosophers, the political foundations of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh are contrary to them. This theory is founded on the presupposition that the right to rule is inherent to no one and is not automatically assigned to anyone. That is, no one has a legal right to be a ruler due to his being born of a certain parentage. The right to rule is not something hereditary that can be transferred from one’s father and mother. Rather, the legitimacy of a ruler and government must emanate from another source. Most philosophers and political philosophy theoreticians accept this principle and also the previous one, and the majority of schools of political philosophy such as the schools supportive of democracy agree with our idea that the right to rule and govern (i.e., legitimacy) is inherited by nobody and it is not automatically assigned to anyone. Rather, it is supposed to be delegated to others by the authority to whom this right originally and essentially belongs.
As such, by establishing these two principles, we have excluded anarchism and the schools and theoreticians that assume that certain individuals and groups automatically and inherently have legitimacy to govern and so they are naturally superior to others.
3. God as the only essential source of legitimacy
After the acceptance of the second principle, this question will naturally surface: What is that source which grants legal authority and legitimacy to a ruler and government? So it is in this point that the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and political philosophy of Islam differ from most other schools especially the current theories. According to this principle which is one of the key foundations of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and political philosophy of Islam and accepted unanimously by Muslims and perhaps, by many religions with divine origins apart from Islam, the right to rule and govern, to bid and forbid, originally belongs to God, the Exalted. Of course, it is worth noting that “to govern” in its specific sense and that is one’s performing of certain actions and direct management of the affairs applies only to human beings, and it is not applicable to God, the Exalted. But its broad sense which involves the instinctive right to rule and to designate the ruler is ascribed to God, the Exalted—the Lord and the Real Owner of everything who has created the world and all beings including man:
لِّلَّهِ ما فِي السَّمَاواتِ وَمَا فِي الأَرْضِ
“To Allah belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth[1].”
Here “real ownership” is used as distinct from “nominal ownership”. In the case of nominal ownership, a person is recognized as “owner” according to a contract between a number of individuals. So, this contract may not be identical in all societies. For example, it might be that in a certain society the contract considers those who find any gold mine, for instance, to be its owners, but in another society it considers all mines as the property of the public and the government is to take charge of them. Real ownership, however, arises from a sort of ontological relationship in which the existence of the owned thing [mamlūk] is originally ascribed to the existence of the owner [mālik]. This kind of relationship is technically called the cause-and-effect relationship. In such an ownership the “contract” does not stipulate that the owned thing belongs to the owner, rather the owned thing truly and ontologically belongs to the Owner and owes existence to Him. Accordingly, since all human beings are created by God, they are all owned by Him. Therefore, the human being not only has no authority whatsoever over other human beings but has no inherent authority over himself because the possessor of authority is someone else. In accordance with this conviction, no human being has the right to amputate any organ of his body, blind his eyes, or commit suicide because the existence of any human being belongs to someone else.
Most of the schools of political philosophy and other cultures oppose this presupposition and hold that every man is free. Therefore, since the authority over the life and property of people and wills and rights of individuals is of the essence in governing, Islam says that no one other than the one who has been delegated by God has the right to have authority over others. In any case, the belief that no one has authority over the servants of God without the permission of God, the Exalted, is a fundamental principle in the Islamic thought.
It is by the acceptance of this principle that political philosophy of Islam can be distinguished from other existing schools in this regard and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh from other theories of government and political systems. It is for this reason that those who believe in the legitimacy of the government of the elite, the philosophers and sages, the nobles and affluent, or those who gain a victory in a war and take over through violence and the use of force and even the theory of democracy (including democracy in its different interpretations and approaches) follow an ideology separate from that of Islamic thought. For example, as a theory democracy is founded on the idea that sovereignty originally belongs to the people and it is their right and it is their vote that determines the legitimacy of ruler and government and gives them legal authority to rule. When we examine the third presupposition already mentioned, we find that it is not consistent with the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh because on the basis of the third presupposition, just as an individual does not inherently have the right to rule, the aggregate of people and society do not inherently have such a right. This is because the entire universe and whatever exists in it belong to God and everything is originally owned by God, the Exalted, and all their movements and acts must have to be in accordance with the command or prohibition of the Real Owner. They have no right to rule over others or to choose someone to rule.
Relevant to this presupposition, we may also point to one of its ramifications which is accepted by all Muslims and that is, due to His original and essential right to govern, God, the Exalted, has in a lower degree, granted this right to the Noble Prophet of Islam, Ḥaḍrat Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh (ṣ) and appointed him a governor having authority over people’s lives, property, rights, and freedom.
Again we emphasize that there is a great difference between the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh or Islamic government in its true sense and as understood and declared by “true Islamologists” [Islāmshināsān-e rāstīn] (an appellation used by Imām Khomeinī (qs) to describe the late Āyatullāh Murtaḍā Muṭahharī)[2] and the theory of democracy, and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh cannot compare with the theory of democracy. Those who wanted or want to do so, whether those who at the outset of Islam and after the demise of the Messenger of Allah (ṣ) designated a ruler contrary to the explicit injunction of God and His Apostle (ṣ) or those who being fascinated by or deluded by the Western culture, present today such an interpretation of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, either have no proper understanding of Islam, or had done or are doing so for personal and political reasons. According to Islam, the right to rule and to designate a ruler originally and essentially belongs to God, the Exalted, and it is only through His decree that this right can be granted to someone, and as we mentioned in the supplementary point to the third presupposition, this right was first granted to the Noble Prophet of Islam (ṣ).
4. The inseparability of religion and politics
One of the most important presuppositions of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh is the inseparability of religion and politics; in other words, politicalization of religion. So, it is incorrect to think that Islam is only concerned with man’s personal affairs in this life and has nothing to do with social matters including those political affairs and the management of society, or to assume that these affairs can be managed by individuals who are free to act according to that which they think appropriate and agree upon. According to the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, apart from its political laws, Islam has a specific theory about government and determination of sovereignty. It is evident that if a person believes that there is no relationship between religion and politics and they have no relation to each other, religious scholars and jurisprudents are responsible only for religious affairs, political affairs is the concern of the statesmen and these two realms are totally separate from each other, then there will remain no place to discuss the issue of the Islamic government and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. Although the purpose of this book is not to prove the soundness of these presuppositions and elaborate the issues related to them, on account of the distinct importance of the fourth presupposition, the next chapter is devoted to the treatment of it.
Curled from the book titled “A Cursory Glance at the Theory of Wilāyat Al-Faqīh” by Āyatullāh Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, translated by Mansoor Limba
Footnotes
[1] . Sūrah al-Baqarah 2:284. In this volume, the translation of Qur’anic passages is adapted from Sayyid ‘Alī Qulī Qarā’ī, The Qur’an with a Phrase-by-Phrase English Translation (London: Islamic College for Advanced Studies Press, 2004). [Trans.]
[2] . Professor Āyatullāh Murtadā Mutahharī (1298-1358 AHS) was born to a family of clergymen on Bahman 13, 1298 AHS [February 3, 1920] in the village of Farīmān near Mashhad. At the age of 12, he went to Mashhad where he learned the basics of Islamic sciences and then moved to Qum where he attended the sessions of the great authorities of the theological center. From 1319 AHS [1940] Mutahharī attended the sessions held by Imām Khomeinī and other famous teachers of the time. Moreover, he himself gave lectures in subjects like Arabic literature, logic, kalām [scholasticism], jurisprudence [fiqh], and philosophy. In 1331 AHS [1952] Mutahharī moved to Tehran and in 1334 AHS [1955] he was invited to teach Islamic sciences at the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Tehran University. He was arrested in the midnight of Khordād 15, 1342 AHS [1963] and remained in prison for 43 days. After Imām Khomeinī’s migration to Paris in France, Mutahharī went to meet him and the Imām assigned to him the responsibility of organizing the Revolutionary Council. On the night of Ordībehesht 11, 1358 AHS [May 1, 1979] Mutahharī was martyred by one of the agents of the terrorist Furqān group. He wrote more than 50 books and tens of articles, and delivered scores of speeches. Imām Khomeinī said of Mutahharī: “His written and spoken words are, without exception, educational and enlivening… I recommend that the students and intellectual groups not to let Mutahharī’s words be forgotten by un-Islamic tricks…” [Trans.]
