The Problem of Evil and Divine Wisdom in Islam

The problem of evil has been a central concern in philosophical and theological discourse across cultures and traditions. In Islam, the existence of evil presents a profound challenge to the understanding of God’s nature, particularly His attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect justice. This problem is further complicated by the notion of divine wisdom, which holds that all of God’s actions, including those that involve suffering or hardship, are inherently purposeful, even if humans cannot always comprehend their ultimate purpose.

This article seeks to explore the Islamic perspectives on the problem of evil and divine wisdom behind it. In doing so, it will highlight how Islamic theology uniquely contributes to the broader Islamic discourse on theodicy, while offering insights into the ethical and spiritual dimensions of the problem of evil.

Divine Justice and the Problem of Evil

Divine justice and the problem of evil is a fundamental question and one of the most discussed topics among theologians and philosophers in the last two thousand years. The most important reason for this attention given to the subject is that human beings have always been faced with natural and moral tragedies. Consequently, some philosophers have doubted God’s justice; others have denied the existence of God or believed in duality, because they were not able to understand how God, the Benevolent, the Omnipotent, the Omniscient, can let these happen.

In religious thought, discussions about God’s justice are often gathered under the term theodicy. In theological writing, theodicy refers to the attempt to explain or defend God’s justice in a world where evil and suffering undeniably exist. For this reason, both “divine justice” and “theodicy” are frequently used interchangeably.

The presence of evil—even when its rationale remains unclear—does not invalidate the concept of theodicy. Rather, it urges us to search for an understanding of why a just and powerful God allows suffering. Exploring this question naturally leads us into the broader doctrine of divine justice.

The question of divine justice is deeply significant because it touches real and pressing human concerns—natural disasters, human wrongdoing, and the inequalities built into social life. A host of objections arise here. People wonder why some regions of the world face constant hardship while others enjoy abundance. Why do individuals differ so greatly—some born healthy, others with illness; some with beauty, others with deformity? These inequalities naturally raise a piercing question: If God is just, why do such differences exist?

Engaging sincerely with both sides of this debate allows us to better understand the issue itself and appreciate why resolving it is essential. For a believer, grappling honestly with the problem of evil is not a threat to faith but an opportunity to deepen it. By confronting these questions openly, seeking clarity, and working toward thoughtful answers, one’s belief becomes more grounded and resilient[1].

Islamic Perspectives on the Problem of Evil

Various explanations have been offered by both theologians and philosophers regarding the problem of evil. In this study, we will focus on the most important perspectives on the subject:

Muslim philosophers argue that evil does not truly exist on its own. Instead, evil is understood as the absence of something good. Sometimes evil is simply total non-existence, and other times it is the lack of an ability or quality that should be present. Because evil is not a real, independent existence, it cannot be something created by God.

Shahid Motahhari, while explaining the concept of non-existence of evil, writes, “the non-existence of evil does not mean that what is known as evil does not exist, so that some might say this is against necessity, because we obviously see that blindness, deafness, oppression, tyranny, ignorance, disability, death, earthquake, and other afflictions exist. We can deny neither their existence nor their evilness. Rather, the point is that all these matters are “non-existential” and “absent,” and their existence is of “faulty” and “empty” types, and they are evil because they are non-entity, non-existence, shortage, and emptiness per se[2].

Some philosophers believe it is obvious that evil has no real existence, but they still offer arguments to support this view. One argument is that existence itself is clearly good. If evil were something that truly exists, then not all existence would be good, and this would break the natural link between existence and goodness—something philosophers consider self-evident. Another argument is that God is the absolute source of all goodness, and only good can come from a completely good being. Therefore, evil cannot be something that truly exists[3].

The second solution offered by philosophers is that evil is a necessary part of the physical world. God has created different levels of existence, including some that are completely good, like the world of angels. In that world, the only limitation is that angels have a restricted level of existence, but there is no conflict or opposition. This shows that God can create a world without conflict or evil. However, in the material world, things naturally come with change, struggle, and opposite forces, and because of this, some degree of evil becomes unavoidable[4].

However, the criticisms against the philosophers’ views on the problem of evil are as follows:

The philosophers’ explanations about evil do not fully match what the Qur’an and Islamic teachings say. Some scholars tried to use certain verses to support the idea that evil is only relative and not real[5]. However, these verses do not clearly say that evil has no real existence. In fact, they could even suggest that evil does exist in some form.

Another problem is that the philosophers’ answers to the problem of evil do not address the emotional and real-life struggles people face. Simply saying that evil does not exist, or that it is necessary in the material world, does not comfort someone who is suffering. As Martyr Motahhari points out, a person who is dealing with hardship can still ask: “Why am I the one suffering? Why couldn’t things be the other way around?” Such questions cannot be solved by just arguing that evil is non-existent or necessary[6].

Shia theologians, especially Twelver Shia, take a different approach from the philosophers. Based on the teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS), they believe that evil truly exists, but it is never without purpose. Every evil comes with a greater benefit that may not be clear to us[7]. Their reasoning to explain the problem of evil as follows:

1. God is perfect and has no need or ignorance. A being only does something bad if it lacks knowledge or needs something. Since God has neither limitation, He cannot do anything ugly or purposeless. So, if something appears evil, it must contain hidden wisdom and benefit.
2. This idea is supported by Qur’anic verses and many teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS). Shia theologians use two main principles to explain this: intiṣāf (Justice and restoration): God will ensure that anyone who is wronged will eventually get their right back. Iwad (Compensation): When suffering happens without a person’s fault, God will compensate them in the Hereafter with a reward so great that the hardship becomes worthwhile.

Based on these principles, Shia scholars divide evils into three types:

1. Evils caused by a person against themselves: These are the result of human free will, so they do not pose a theological problem.
2. Evils caused by one person against another: Though God allows free will, He will ultimately restore justice, either in this world or the next.
3. Natural disasters and hardships with no human cause: These are compensated by God in the Hereafter, so the sufferer is not ultimately harmed[8].

In short, Twelver Shia theologians, contrary to the philosophers, say that evil is real and does have existence. Scholars like Shaykh Ṭūsī state that anything that causes a person pain, suffering, or goes against human nature must truly exist[9]. Sharīf Murtaḍā explains this with an example: when a person’s arm is cut, they feel pain at that moment, even though they did not feel it before. This proves that the pain—and therefore evil—is something real and not just an absence or non-existence[10]. Thus, the Shia theologians accept that evil exists but argue that it always carries wisdom, justice, and benefit from God’s perspective.

Conclusion

In Islamic thought, the problem of evil is seen as a complex phenomenon that arises from multiple sources, primarily from human actions, as well as from natural events that are outside human control. The distinction between moral evil and natural evil plays a significant role in Islamic discussions on theodicy.

The approaches of Muslim philosophers and early Twelver Shia theologians toward the problem of evil differ sharply. From the time of Plato onward, philosophers generally regarded evil as non-existent in reality. Whether they understood evil as relative or absolute, their main argument was that evil is not created by God. Since God and His creations are purely good, evil is considered a lack of goodness and something that occurs accidentally, not as an independent creation.

In contrast, most theologians, especially early Twelver Shia scholars, held that evil does possess real existence. This view is supported by Qur’anic verses that speak of the creation of death, darkness, and other difficult realities, as well as numerous traditions that imply the existence of evil. However, since God is All-Wise and never acts without purpose, any evil that exists must serve a meaningful role in His plan.

According to these theologians, whether an evil is caused by humans or occurs naturally, it is always tied to divine wisdom and benefit. When one person harms another, it becomes necessary for God to restore justice, either in this life or the next – for example, by transferring the good deeds of the oppressor to the oppressed or by reducing the burden of the victim’s sins. If the suffering is the result of natural causes with no human involvement, God compensates the afflicted person with such a reward and benefit in the Hereafter that, if given the choice, the person would prefer the suffering over missing its compensation.

Notes:

[1] . Ghulam Husayn Adeel (2010). Divine Justice and the Problem of Evil, p. 4.

[2] . Motahhari, Morteza (n.d.). Majmū-e Ᾱthār, vol. 1: 151.

[3] . Muḥammadriḍā’ī, M. (2011). New Theology, pp. 316-317; Mullā Ṣadrā, Ṣ. (1981). Al-Ḥikma al-Muti‘āliyya fī al-Asfār al-‘Aqliyya al-Arba‘a, vol. 6: 133.

[4] . Ḥusayn ‘Imādzādeh; Mahdī Farmāniyān. (2021). The Problem of Evil from the Viewpoint of the Twelver Shī‘a Theology, p. 124.

[5] . Ṭabāṭabā’ī, M. (1995), Tarjumeh of Tafsīr al-Mīzān, vol. 3: 21.

[6] . Motahhari, Morteza. (n.d.). Majmū-e Ᾱthār, vol. 1: 173-174.

[7] . Qadrdān Malikī, M. (1997). “The problem of evil from the viewpoint of theologians,” p. 34.

[8] . Ḥusayn ‘Imādzādeh; Mahdī Farmāniyān. (2021). The Problem of Evil from the Viewpoint of the Twelver Shī‘a Theology, pp. 127-128.

[9] . Ṭūsī, M. (1985). Al-Iqtiṣād fīmā yata‘allaq bil-i‘tiqād, vol. 2: 141.

[10] . Sharīf Murtaḍā, A. (1990). Al-Dhakhīra fī ‘ilm al-kalām, p. 211.

References

1. Ghulam Husayn Adeel. (2010). Divine Justice and the Problem of Evil. Tehran: Ahlul Bayt World Assembly.
2. Ḥusayn ‘Imādzādeh; Mahdī Farmāniyān. (2021). “The Problem of Evil from the Viewpoint of the Twelver Shī‘a Theology.” Journal of Contemporary Islamic Studies (JCIS) 2021, 3(1): 121-130
3. Motahhari, Morteza. (n.d.). Majmū-e Ᾱthār. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications.
4. Muḥammadriḍā’ī, M. (2011). New Theology (with a Comparative Approach). Qom: Nashr Ma‘ārif.
5. Mullā Ṣadrā, Ṣ. (1981). Al-Ḥikma al-Muti‘āliyya fī al-Asfār al-‘Aqliyya al-Arba‘a. Beirut: Dār al-Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī.
6. Qadrdān Malikī, M. (1997), “The Problem of Evil from the Viewpoint of Theologians.” Nameh Mofid, no. 11, 21-42.
7. Sharīf Murtaḍā, A. (1990), Al-Dhakhīra fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām. Editor: Muḥammad Ḥusaynī, n.p.: Mu’assaseh al-Nashr al-Islāmī.
8. Ṭabāṭabā’ī, M. (1995), Tarjumeh of Tafsīr al-Mīzān. Translator: Muḥammad Bāqir Mūsawī Hamidānī. Qom: Islamic Publications Office.
9. Ṭūsī, M. (1985). Al-Iqtiṣād fīmā yata‘allaq bil-i‘tiqād. Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā’.